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WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION PANELS:
FAILING TO PROTECT AGAINST
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
David M. Schwarz'

INTRODUCTION
The December 15, 1993 adoption of the Uruguay Round' of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT) 2 marked the culmination
of seven years of negotiations The Agreement includes the establishment of a long awaited governing body, the World Trade Organization
(WTO).4 The WTO, implemented by Congress on December 8, 1992,'

* J.DJM.B.A. Candidate, 1997, Washington College of Law/Kogod College of
Business Administration, The American University. The author wishes to thank Max
W. Holland, I, Cam B. Goodman and Gabriela Boyer for their insight and invaluable assistance.
1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.LM. 9 [hereinafter GAIT,
Uruguay Round].
2. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATI1, reprinted in 4 GENERAL
AGREEMENTS ON TARITFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUIENTS AND SELECTED DOcuMiENTS (1969) [hereinafter BISD]. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE

LAw OF GATT (1969) (providing a thorough overview of the first 25 years
of GAT); OLIvIER LONG, LAW AND rTs LIMIrATIONS IN THE GAIT MULTILATERAL
TRADE SYSTEM (1987) (clarifying many of the complexities of GAIT).
3. 1 Tim GAIT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 7 (Terence P.
Stewart ed., 1993) [hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS]. The Uruguay Round
negotiations opened in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on September 22, 1986. Id. at I.
4. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 [hereinafter WTO]. "Multilateral Trade Organization" (MTO) was changed to "World Trade Organization" (WTO) in all Uruguay
Round documents. Id. The text of the WTO reads in part that the parties to the
agreement resolve to "develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral
trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results
of past trade liberalization efforts, and all the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations... ." WTO pmbl.; see LENORE SE.K CONG. RES. SERe.,
AND THE
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will provide the legal mechanism that the GATT Contracting Parties
envisioned since the International Trade Organization (ITO) was drafted
in 1947.6

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE URUGUAY ROUND 6 (1994) (defining the WTO as an
"umbrella body," overseeing the Uruguay Round of GATIT); The World Trade Organization and U.S. Sovereignty: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of John H. Jackson, Professor of Law, University of Michigan) [hereinafter WTO Hearing] (describing the WTO as a "miniCharter"). The WTO incorporates the Uruguay Round agreements into a procedural
and institutional framework. Id. GATT practices and institutional ideology will transfer
to the WTO in a form more easily accessible to attorneys, governments and the public. Id. Furthermore, the recent GATT maintains separate identities for procedural rules
and institutional concepts. Id.
5. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (December 8, 1994). Implementation of the WTO followed months of political posturing.
See GAT: Senate Finance Committee Ends Review of GATT Bill, Set to Consider
Amendments, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (July 22, 1994) available in WESTLAW,
BNA-BTD database (stating the Clinton Administration's proposal to put the WTO
ratification legislation on "fast track" authority); Trade Talks: Quad Ministers Discuss
Transition to WTO, But Break No New Ground, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 13, 1994,
available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD database (reporting that the United States, Canada, Japan, and the European Union emphasized at a two day trade summit, that they
were committed to the ratification of the Uruguay Round by the January 1, 1995
deadline); But see, e.g., Hill's Patience Waning on GATT Bill, NAT'L J. CONG. DAILY
A.M., July 13, 1994, at 1 (reporting that the Clinton Administration was in danger of
losing Democratic support for implementation of the Uruguay Round because of attempts to solicit support from Republicans); Bob Davis, Clinton to Drop "Fast-Track"
Bid in GATT Pact, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1994, at A2 (stating that the Clinton Administration abandoned "fast-track" legislation for the WTO to increase the
agreement's chances of passing through Congress). The United States Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, predicted that the WTO would move through Congress rapidly
since the "fast-track" authority had been dropped. World Trade Pact to Move Fast,
Kantor Asserts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1994, at A20 [hereinafter Trade Pact to Move
Fast].
6. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GAIT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION, 10-14 (1970) (concluding that the failure to implement the ITO was
the result of the United States' dissatisfaction with the terms of the agreement);
LONG, supra note 2, at I (commenting that the intended role of the ITO was to
work with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to expand and reestablish international trade); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 917 (1990) (discussing that the ITO's failure to fill a gap in international economic
institutions following the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, led to the acceptance of
GATT as the primary trade organization). Although GATT was initially ineffective in
managing global trade and was laden with "birth defects," it evolved into a mechanism that successfully governed the growing complexities of trade. WTO Hearing,
supra note 4.

1995]

WTO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

957

A key provision in the WTO is the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the Understanding).! The
Understanding modifies earlier GATIr dispute settlement mechanisms,
such as the panel procedure,' and establishes an appeals process for
panel decisions. The panel procedure provides shorter timetables for the
adjudication of disputes'0 and creates more binding decisions" than
were previously available under GAIT." The appeals process grants a
party the opportunity to have a panel report reviewed by a Standing
Appellate Body.' 3 Nonetheless, whether the new dispute resolution procedure can effectively govern trade disputes is an issue that has ignited
controversy."

7. WTO, supra note 4, annex II.
8. Id. annex 11, arts. 6-16.
9. Id. annex II, arts. 17-23. A thorough discussion of the VTO appellate procedure is beyond the scope of this comment and will only be mentioned in relation to
its possible role in recommended changes to the panel procedure. See generally id.
(governing panel decision appeals).
10. See id. annex II, art. 6.1 (directing the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to
convene within 15 days of a party's request for a panel); id. annex II, arts. 8.5, 8.7
(stating that if the disputants cannot agree on the composition of a panel within twenty days of the establishment of a panel procedure, the Director-General will appoint
the panelists); id. annex II, art. 12.8 (providing a general six-month guideline for the
completion of the panel process, tolling at the time the panel composition commences).
11. See id. annex II, art. 16.4 (stating that unless a party appeals a panel decision or the decision is blocked by a consensus of the GAIT Contracting Parties, the
panel's report shall be adopted within 60 days).
12. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (discussing the lengthy panel
process in early GATT disputes).
13. WTO, supra note 4, annex I, arts. 17-20. The Appellate Body is composed
of seven members and is established by the DSB. Id. annex II, art. 17.1. Three of
the seven members will serve, in rotation, on each case. Id. The Appellate Body will
reflect a broad representation of VTO members. Id. annex H1,art. 17.3. Furthermore,
Appellate Body members are directed to "stay abreast" of dispute settlement procedures and other WTO activities. Id.
14. See Helene Cooper, World Trade Organization Created by GA7T Isn't the
Lion of Its Foes or the Lamb of Its Backers, VAtL ST. J., July 14. 1994, at A12
(reporting that the rhetoric from both sides of the WTO debate is not necessarily an
accurate assessment of the WTO). Critics of the wTO have voiced concerns over
what effect the new Understanding's binding panel process will impose on disputing
parties. Id. Proponents of the WTO welcome the changes in the panel procedure and
view the new procedure as an effective tool that ultimately will give GAT the procedural reinforcement it now lacks. Letter from Michael Kantor, United States Trade
Representative, to United States Senators and Congressmen 1-4 (Apr. 29, 1994) [here-
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Since GATT's conception, the Contracting Parties have continued to
negotiate and amend the Agreement by addressing the problems of timely delays and vague, unenforceable of panel decisions. 5 Nevertheless,
an important area not addressed satisfactorily by the Parties is the issue
of conflicts of interest and bias in the panel process. 6 These conflicts
arise when a panel member assigned to a dispute is financially, politically or personally tied to a sector or industry that is the subject of the
dispute. 7 This comment discusses the lack of substantive conflict of
interest provisions in the Understanding by analyzing the current rules
and suggesting the adoption of more rigid conflict of interest safeguards
based upon existing models.
Part I of this comment examines the growth of the dispute settlement
panel procedure under GATT, discussing an early case that illustrates
the weaknesses in the procedure. Part II examines the WTO and the
panel procedure under the new Understanding, emphasizing the limited
conflict of interest provisions. Part III discusses the conflict of interest
guidelines in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)
as a possible model for the WTO and examines the strengths and weaknesses of the CAFTA rules. Part IV recommends changes in the WTO
panel procedure and suggests the adoption of some of the key conflict
of interest provisions from CAFTA.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GATT DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PANEL PROCEDURES
A. OVERVIEW
When GATT was conceived in 1947, Article XXIH'8 constituted the

inafter USTR Letter] (on file with The American University Journal of International
Law and Policy).
15. See infra notes 24-42 and accompanying text (discussing dispute resolution
panel weaknesses in an early GATT case).
16. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (explaining the failure of the
WTO to adequately provide for inevitable conflicts of interest among panel members).
17. See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (illustrating the conflicts of
interest that arise when non-governmental trade panelists have vested interests in the
specific industry involved in a dispute).
18. GATT, supra note 2. Article XXIII, paragraph 1 states in pertinent part:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly
or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded . . . the contracting party may . . . make written proposals to the other contracting party or
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primary dispute adjudication provision. 9 In 1955, GAT" members
adopted a panel procedure directing a five or seven member panel to
issue a report based on the panel's recommendations to resolve the dispute. 0 A consensus among the leading GA'T" members regarding the

meaning and intent of the Agreement resulted in the effective adjudication of a majority of early panel decisions.2' Furthermore, cooperation

by respondent governments in the dispute resolution process aided in the
successful implementation of early panel decisions.' After the first ten
years, however, the use of the panel procedure diminished, due in part

to increasing opposition by respondents.

One particular dispute,

known as the DISC case, tested the limits of GATIT's informal panel
procedure and illustrated the need for a settled dispute resolution process.
B. THE DISC CASE
A dispute concerning the United States Domestic International Sales
Organization (DISC)24 revealed some of the weaknesses of the GATr
dispute settlement process. DISC, a United States tax law, enabled
parties which it considers to be concerned.
Id. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute, the GA'IT members will make
recommendations to the disputing parties following an investigation. Id. art. XXIH.
para. 2. If the matter is considered serious enough, GAIT may "authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend application to the other contracting parties of such
concessions or other obligations under [the] Agreement as [the GAT members] determine to be appropriate in the circumstances." Id.
19. See Robert E. Hudec, Adjudication of International Trade Disputes, 16
THAMES ESSAY 7 (1978) (stating that Article XXIII provided only "skeletal" rules for
the dispute settlement process); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEi 94
(1989) (coining Article XXIII as the "centerpiece" for the dispute resolution process
and claiming that the article has evolved into an elaborate mechanism over forty
years of practice); LONG, supra note 2, at 73 (stating that the early dispute settlement
process evolved through custom and practice).
20. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 95. Dispute resolution prior to the panel process
was experimental and relatively primitive. Hudec, supra note 19, at 7-8.
21. Hudec, supra note 19, at 9.
22. Id. at 9-10. Between 1948 and 1959, approximately 807 of the 13 panel
adjudications yielded completely or partially satisfactory results. Id. at 8. The adjudication of a dispute would normally not move forward unless a defendant agreed. Id.
at 10.
23. Id. at 11. The use of panel procedure in dispute resolution dropped from 54
between 1948 and 1959, to 22 from 1960 to 1977. Id.
24. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 501-507, 85 Stat. 535 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 991-997 (1982 & West Supp. 1988)).
25. Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of
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qualifying exporters to avoid federal taxes on certain export earnings.26
In 1972, the European Community (EC) filed a claim with GATT alleging that the tax incentives operated as a subsidy in violation of GAT
rules." The United States subsequently filed counterclaims against Belgium, the Netherlands and France, claiming that these nations' tax laws
similarly violated GATT. 8
Establishing a panel for the dispute became a cumbersome and extended process.29 The United States requested that a certain number of
panel members be experts in tax law.' The parties were concerned

the DISC CASE, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1443, 1507 (1988). Most commentators have labeled the DISC case as one of GATT's greatest dispute settlement failures. See id. at
1444 (reporting that the DISC case has been called "the largest and most conspicuous
failure in the history of GATT's litigation procedure"). The DISC case covers a complex array of issues and will be discussed here only in the context of panel procedures. See generally John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The
DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1978) (providing a thorough discussion
of the DISC case).
26. 26 U.S.C. §§ 991-997 (1982 & West Supp. 1988)).
27. United States Tax Legislation (DISC), Report of the Panel to the Council of
Representatives, Nov. 12, 1976, reprinted in 23 BISD 98 (1977) [hereinafter DISC
Report].
28. Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, Report of the Panel Presented to
the Council of Representatives, Nov. 12, 1976, reprinted in 23 BISD 114 (1977)
[hereinafter France Report]; Income Tax Practices Maintained by Belgium, Report of
the Panel Presented to the Council of Representatives, Nov. 12, 1976, reprinted in 23
BISD 127 (1977) [hereinafter Belgium Report]; Income Tax Practices Maintained by
The Netherlands, Report of the Panel Presented to the Council of Representatives,
Nov. 12, 1976, reprinted in 23 BISD 137 (1977) [hereinafter Netherlands Report]. A
preliminary procedure in a GATI dispute is consultations between the parties. GAIT,
supra note 2, art. XXII, para. 1.After consultation proceedings failed and months of
procedural delays followed, the parties agreed upon a panel procedure. See Hudec,
supra note 25, at 1462 (opining that the agreement for panel adjudication marked a
"victory" for the complaining party).
29. See Hudec, supra note 25, at 1464 (reporting that the DISC panel took almost three years to assemble). The United States felt that if a panel decided that
DISC violated GATI provisions, it would be doubtful that the same panel would consider the tax laws of the three European countries valid. Jackson, supra note 25, at
762. Although United States officials preferred a decision in favor of their position,
they maintained that if the panel was going to consider DISC a subsidy in violation
of GATT laws, then the tax laws of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands should
also be found illegal. Id. The European delegates objected to the creation of one
panel to hear the four individual complaints and continued to press for four separate
panels. Id.
30. Hudec, supra note 25, at 1464; see Jackson, supra note 25, at 762 (stating
that experts have traditionally been GATT officials).
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with locating neutral experts.3 Ultimately, after nearly three years of
inaction following the filing of the dispute, 2- a five member panel was
picked to hear the four claims.33 The panel consisted of three GATI
delegation officials from Geneva and two tax experts from the ECr 4
Nonetheless, the United States was less concerned about conflict of interest problems than if the experts were government employees, arguably
more susceptible to national influences.'
The panel deliberated for approximately ten months and handed down
similar findings for each of the four disputes.' The reports defined
DISC and the EC parties' tax laws as export subsidies under the applicable GATT provisions.37 All four decisions, however, were vague and
incomplete.'
31. Jackson, supra note 25, at 762-63; see Hudec, supra note 25, at 1465
(stating that the DISC case is an illustration of how pressures for neutral panel choices cause lengthy delays in procedure). The United States, wanting to establish a precedent for bringing in outside experts, continued to press for the use of non-governmental panel members. Jackson, supra note 25, at 762-63. The United States had
voiced concerns about the EC's influence on GAIT during the time of the DISC
case. Id. at 763. Because of the E's influence, the DISC panel was aware that,
regardless of the outcome, a panel report that went against EC interests would be
difficult to enforce. Id.
32. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATI LEGAL SYSTEiM 88 (1993) (asserting that the delay in
the procedure was the result of a number of unexpected political circumstances).
33. Hudec, supra note 25, at 1464.
34. See DISC Report, supra note 27, at 98 (listing the panel members as L J.
Mariadeson, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka Geneva (Chairman); W. Falconer, Director of Trade Policy, Department of Trade and Industry, Wellington; T.
Gabrielsson, Counsellor of Embassy, Permanent Delegation of Sweden to the European
Communities, Brussels; F. Forte, Professor of public finance. University of Turin; and
A. R. Prest, Professor of Economics of the Public Sector, London School of Economics).
35. Jackson, supra note 25, at 763.
36. DISC Report, supra note 27, at 98; France Report, supra note 28, at 114;
Belgium Report, supra note 28, at 127; Netherlands Report, supra note 28, at 137.
37. DISC .Report, supra note 27, at 98, 112; France Report, supra note 28, at
114, 125; Belgium Report, supra note 28, at 127, 135; Netherlands Report, supra
note 28, at 137, 145; see GATT, supra note 2, art. XVI, para. 4. (defining export
subsidies). Article XVI states that
contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of
subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the
comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market.
Id.
38. Jackson, supra note 25, at 764. Although the specific dynamics that went
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Conceivably, the reports may have been intentionally vague as a result
of outside influences on panel members." Furthermore, the panel was
aware that if either party disagreed with the decisions, the reports could
be blocked unilaterally.' Whatever the reasons, if the case was decided
under the WTO, the parties would have been unable to block the reports
and inequitable decisions may have resulted from a biased panel." The
parties would then be bound to accept the rulings and either amend their
laws or face trade sanctions.42
C. THE TOKYO ROUND
The Tokyo Round43 attempted to resolve some of the problematic
issues inherent in the panel procedure." The negotiations addressed
panel delays and the importance of securing impartial panels.' The

into the decisions of the panel are not known, certain factors may have been responsible for the vague reports. See Hudec, supra note 25, at 1468-69 (explaining that the
reports were obscure partly because the panel had engaged in the style of decision
making that had developed in dispute procedures 'over the years). The panel intentionally refrained from stating its intent directly and left its decision open to interpretation
by the parties and other GATI members in proceedings following the panel report.
Id.; see also HUDEC, supra note 32, at 74 (explaining that the commonplace "diplomatic" form of decisions rendered through the time of the DISC case was declining).
39. Jackson, supra note 25, at 764. Some commentators have suggested that the
DISC panel may have been subject to "political compromises." See id. (discussing
speculations relating to why the panel reports may have been incomplete and vague).
40. See Hudec, supra note 25, at 1486 (suggesting that the panel wanted to find
DISC in violation of GATT subsidy rules while exonerating the EC countries). A
decision that ruled against DISC and not against the three EC nation& was not a
practical consideration because it would have been ultimately blocked by the United
States. Jackson, supra note 25, at 763.
41. See Jackson, supra note 25, at 764 (discussing ways the DISC panel may
have been influenced).
42. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (explaining the consequences a
party may face under the binding panel provisions of the WTO).
43. AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. DOC. NO. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1979) [hereinafter
TOKYO ROUND].
44. See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 96 (explaining that the "Group Framework
Committee" set out to improve the dispute settlement process and to examine existing
procedures).
45. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An
Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 147-48 (1980) (stating that concerns
that insufficient dispute resolution provisions were weakening the effectiveness of
GATT were a primary issue in Tokyo Round negotiations).
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resulting document, the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (the Tokyo Round Understand-

ing)' partially modified the dispute resolution procedures in an attempt
to amend the weaknesses of previous GAIT practices.

'

The Tokyo

Round Understanding did not substantially alter dispute resolution procedures. s Instead, it simply codified existing informal practices.'
The Tokyo Round Understanding did not provide any substantive

solutions for the delaying tactics in panel procedures, but it did establish
a time frame for panel compositions ° In practice, however, the parties
were ultimately responsible for minimizing lengthy panel delays.51
Since the Tokyo Round, the panel composition process has not experienced the delays endured in the DISC case.' As will be discussed fur-

ther, 3 the success of any recommended modifications to the current
WTO dispute resolution process will partially depend on adhering to the
timetables codified during the Tokyo Round and refined in the current
Understanding. 4
The Tokyo Round Understanding provided little in the way of conflict
5 The limited conflict of interest provisions codified in
of interest rules&"
46. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, reprinted in 26 BISD 210 (1980) [hereinafter Tokyo
Round Understanding].
47. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 96-97. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMI'N, REviEW
OF THE EFF.civENEsS OF TRADE DIsPUTE SmTuwEENT UNDER THE GATT AND
TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS, Pub. 1793 (Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S.
Senate, on Investigation No. 332-212 under Section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930)
(1985) [hereinafter USITC REvIEw] (discussing the vulnerability of the panel process
to delaying tactics by the parties).
48. USITC REvIEw, supra note 47, at 27.
49. Id.

50. Tokyo Round Understanding, supra note 46, para. 11. The Understanding
required that a panel "should be constituted as promptly as possible and normally not
later than thirty days" from the time that the parties request the establishment of the
panel. Id.
51.

Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GAiT Panel Works and

Does Not, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 53, 95 (1987).
52. See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GAMT, II FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
51, 84 (1987) (stating that following the Tokyo Round, delaying tactics have not been
a substantial problem).
53. See infra note 204 and accompanying text (recommending rigid adherence to
panel procedure timetables to ensure the effective implementation of suggested conflict
of interest provisions).
54. See generally WTO, supra note 4, annex II, arts. 6.1-12.12 (listing panel
procedure time limits).
55. See Tokyo Round Understanding, supra note 46, para. 11 (stating that citi-
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the Tokyo Round Understanding were transferred to the WTQ in essentially the same for.M 6 While the current rules should prevent most
biases that result from panelists' national loyalties, the provisions are
insufficient for the prevention of other types of conflicts that will inevitably occur under the WTO Understanding. 7
D. THE URUGUAY ROUND
With increasing globalization, national interdependence, and the proliferation of trade,58 a new round of negotiations became crucial to the
success of GATT.59 The increased need for intellectual property rules
and for provisions governing services hastened the initiation of the new
round.' In 1986, the Punta del Este Declaration, 6 ' a statement of negotiating objectives that mandated the Uruguay Round,62 reflected the
necessity of a more efficient GATT dispute settlement procedure.63 The
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement stated that strengthening the
rules governing panel procedures and increasing enforcement of panel
decisions would be its primary objectives.' The negotiating group

zens of a party to a dispute cannot be panel members for that dispute). Paragraph 14
of the Understanding states that panel members should "serve in their individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any organization" and that governments shall "not give them instructions nor seek to influence
them as individuals with regards to matters before a panel." Id. para. 14.
56. Tokyo Round Understanding, supra note 46, paras. 11, 14. Paragraphs II and
14 of the Tokyo Round Understanding contain virtually the identical conflict of interest language as articles 8.3 and 8.7 of the WTO Understanding. WTO, supra note 4,
annex II, arts. 8.3, 8.7. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (explaining the
current conflict of interest provisions in the WTO Understanding).
57. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts that may
arise between panelists and the subject matter of disputes).
58. See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 61-86 (1988) (commenting
on the interdependence of the global economy through structural changes in trade and
foreign investment).
59.

JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 38 (1990).

60. Id.
61. GAIT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 22, 1986, 25
I.L.M. 1623 (1986) [hereinafter Punta del Este Declaration].
62. URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 3, at 7.
63. Punta del Este Declaration, supra note 61, at 1623. The Declaration reads in
part: "In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of
all contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the rules and
the procedures of the dispute settlement process." Id.
64. URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 3, at 58; see Henry R. Nau,
Domestic Trade Politics: An Overview in DOMESTIC TRADE POLITICS AND THE URU-
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again at
tempted to resolve some of the past infirmities of the panel procedure,
including the delays in the composition of panels' and the possibility

of conflicts of interest among panel members.'
The Uruguay Round negotiators stressed the importance of including

non-governmental experts in the pool of eligible panelists.67 The Tokyo
Round mentioned the use of non-governmental panelists, but its rules
were contradictory.' In 1984, as the need for more trade specialists

grew,69 the Contracting Parties agreed upon the creation of a roster of
non-governmental panelists." The Uruguay Round negotiating group
understood that the addition of more non-governmental experts would
alleviate some of the difficulties in finding expert panel members by
providing a broader pool of individuals.7 '
Establishing a more expansive list of panelists presumably shortens

the panel composition process by simplifying the search for qualified
experts.' A consequence of expanding the list of non-governmental
panelists is the increased likelihood that an expert may have a conflict
of interest. The need for non-governmental trade experts to settle
technical disputes invariably involves the use of panelists that are the
most likely to have a vested interest in the subject matter of the dispute.74
ROUND 1, 17 (Henry R. Nau ed., 1989) (discussing the need for nondiscriminatory safeguards in dispute settlement under the Uruguay Round).
65. URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 3, at 58.
66. See John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional
Appraisal, 12 LAv & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 21, 42 (1980) (discussing the difficulty in
securing a panel member insulated from political and economic influences).
67. URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 3. at 58; see HtIDEC, supra
note 32, at 100 (asserting that the DISC case demonstrated that a more efficient dispute settlement procedure would necessitate a stronger role for trade attorneys).
68. Tokyo Round Understanding, supra note 46, para. 11. Paragraph II of the
Tokyo Round Understanding states that "It]he members of a panel would preferably
be governmental." Id. Paragraph 13. however, states that "[iln order to facilitate the
constitution of panels" a list of eligible "governmental and non-governmental" individuals should be maintained. Id. para. 13.
69. Hudec, supra note 25, at 1466.
70. See Dispute Settlement Procedures, Nov. 30, 1984, reprinted in 31 BISD 9-10
para. 1 (1985) (proposing the creation of a roster of non-governmental panelists).
71. URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 3. at 58.
72. Hudec, supra note 25, at 1465.
73. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of
preventing conflicts of interest when trade attorneys are empaneled for disputes involving private industries).
74. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (explaining that the usage of
GUAY
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With the Uruguay Round negotiations delayed because of conflicting
positions on dispute settlement issues," Director-General Arthur Dunkel
released his draft Protocol to the Final Act in December of 1991 .76
Negotiations on a number of contentious issues" continued for the following two years and finally concluded on December 15, 1993, when
the Uruguay Round was adopted by consensus, thereby establishing the
WTO and a presumably improved GATT dispute settlement mechanism.78
II. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A.

OVERVIEW OF THE UNDERSTANDING ON RULES
AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING DISPUTES

The WTO is the institutional framework and legal mechanism encompassing GATT79 and controlling the administration and operation of
related agreements.8" Consequently, a debate has erupted8 concerning

trade attorneys in CAFTA panels has increased the likelihood of conflicts between the
panelists' professional ties and the subject matter of disputes).
75. URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 3, at 59.
76. See id. at 60-65 (outlining the dispute settlement negotiation positions of the
United States, the European Community, Japan, Canada, Mexico, and a bloc of Developing Countries, in relation to the terms of Director-General Dunkel's draft of the
Uruguay Round).
77. Id. at 59. The issues that remained unsettled were the establishment of a
legal agreement that would alleviate the possibility of unilateral actions by a party;
rules of procedure governing decisions made by the WTO Council; provisions concerning how less developed countries would be treated under the new agreement; and
procedures for filing complaints unrelated to violations of GATT agreements. Id.
78. GATI', Uruguay Round, supra note 1;see URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS,
supra note 3, at 24-44 (examining the final issues of negotiation before the adoption
of the Uruguay Round).
79. WTO, supra note 4, art. II.
80. Id. art. III.
81. See Cooper, supra note 14, at A12 (reporting the key issues surrounding the
WTO debate); Falsely Demonizing the Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1994 at 18
(opining that the WTO is "neither flawless [n]or harmless"); The GATT Lady Sings:
What the New WTO Will Mean for the U.S. and World Trade, II INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) No. 15, at 595 (Apr. 13, 1994) [hereinafter The GATT Lady Sings] (statement
of John H. Jackson, law professor, University of Michigan) (responding to criticisms
of the WTO); Warnings of Sovereignty Loss are "Simplistic," USTR Official Says, 11
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 738 (May 11, 1994) [hereinafter Sovereignty
Warnings Simplistic] (statement of Rufus H. Yerxa, Deputy United States Trade Representative) (stating that the debate over the WTO will be as "contentious and just as
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issues related to the voting structure' and the dispute resolution procedure.' Since the WTO does not allow reservations,' members must

filled with misunderstanding, disinformation, [and] miscalculations" as the NAFTA
debate was); Nancy Dunne, U.S. Test for a "Dead Fish" 7Theory, FIN. TIMES. May
25, 1994, at 5 (commenting that opponents of the WTO, including Ralph Nader and
Representative Newt Gingrich, span a broad political spectrum).
82. See WTO, supra note 4, arts. IX, X (mandating that decision making and
amendments to the WTO are made by consensus, and in cases where a consensus
cannot be reached, decisions and most amendments are put to a three-fourths majority
vote). Amendments to the following provisions must be made by consensus: VTO
arts. IX and X; arts. I and II of GAIT, Annex IA; art. I1:1, Annex lB of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); art. 4 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) including Annex IC, Trade in
Counterfeit Goods. Id. art. X. The voting structure in GATT has historically been a
hybrid based upon unanimity and majority voting, although the voting structure in the
WTO reflects unanimity in the amendment and decision processes and majority voting
if there is a lack of consensus. See generally Stephen Zamora, Voting in International
Economic Organizations,74 AM. J.INT'L L. 566 (1980) (examining voting structures
of international organizations).
83. See Cooper, supra note 14, at A12 (reporting that the binding effect of the
WTO panel procedure is among the most contentious areas of debate). Opponents of
the WTO claim that countries intending to challenge U.S. laws will attempt to use
the panel procedure to secure favorable decisions. Statement of Kevin L. Kearns,
President, United States Business and Industrial Council (June 13, 1994) (on file with
The American University Journal of International Law and Policy). Kevin L Kears
is the founder of Save Our Sovereignty, an organization comprised of business leaders
opposing the WTO. UNITED STATES BUS. INDUS. CouNs., BUSINESS LEADER ANNOUNCES FORMATION OF "SAVE OUR SOVEREIGNTY" TO OPPOSE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (1994) [hereinafter SAVE OUR SOVEREIGNTY] (on file with The American
University Journal of International Law and Policy). Consumer interest groups suggest
that the European Union (EU) is specifically targeting United States food safety laws.
PUBLIC CITIZEN AND THE ENvTL. WORKING GROUP, TRADING AWAY FOOD SAFETY at
iv (1994) [hereinafter TRADING AwAY FOOD SAFETY] (on file with The American
University Journal of International Law and Policy). The EU has stated that the complex regulatory standards imposed by the United States severely impede market access.
SERVICES OF THE EUROPEAN CoMINussIoN, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 55 (1994) (on file with The American University Journal of
International Law and Policy). Technically, if the EU files a dispute under the new
Understanding and a panel finds in their favor, the United States will have to amend
its food safety regulations or face trade sanctions. See Mark Mcmmott. Opponents Say
Deal Jeopardizes U.S. Interest, U.S.A. TODAY, June 27, 1994, at 4B (statement of
Ralph Nader) (charging that the WTO "subordinates all sorts of U.S. laws to the
dictates of foreign trade"); VTO, supra note 4, annex 11, art. 22 (outlining the rules
governing compensation and the suspension of concessions in the event a panel decision is not implemented).
Save Our Sovereignty asserts that American sovereignty will be endangered
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accept all terms and provisions as written.85 Thus, the Contracting Parties, by acceding to the Agreement, agree to the terms of the dispute
settlement process.86
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Disputes is

because the WTO will impose an obligation on the United States to change its laws
and regulations to conform with panel decisions. SAVE OUR SOVEREIGNTY, supra; see
James Gerstenzang, GATT Brings Clinton Threat of New Trade Controversy, L.A.
TIMES, July 5, 1994, at B5, B6 (commenting that the sovereignty debate is potentially
one of the most emotional aspects surrounding the WTO); Samuel Francis, The
Choice is Your Country or Their GATT, WASH. TIMEs, June 28, 1994, at A20
(statement of Dan R. Bucks, Executive Director, Multistate Tax Commission) (arguing
that a WTO ruling favoring foreign taxpayers could result in overturning United
States state tax laws if the laws are considered "unjustified discrimination"). But see
USTR Letter, supra note 14, addendum II, at I (responding that U.S. sovereignty
cannot be affected by adverse panel rulings because only Congress and the Executive
Branch have the power to change the laws); Sovereignty Warnings Simplistic, supra
note 81, at 738 (statement of Rufus H. Yerxa, Deputy United States Trade Representative) (asserting that fears that the WTO will threaten U.S. sovereignty are "arcane
and largely irrelevant").
Another concern of WTO opponents is the confidentiality of panel deliberations.
TRADING AWAY FOOD SAFETY, supra, at 81-82; see Trade Pact to Move Fast, supra
note 5, at A20 (reporting that an organization of newspaper editors established
through the Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University argues
that Americans have a "constitutional right to access" to the dispute resolution deliberations that will be impeded by the secretive nature of the process). Article 14.1
states that "panel deliberations shall be confidential." WTO, supra note 4, annex II,
art. 14.1.
84. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 16.5. Historically, the number of reservations that have been asserted in multilateral treaties have been in the minority. See
generally John K. Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic
View of State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372 (1980) (finding that only 15% of the
1164 multilateral conventions that entered into force between 1919 and 1971 contained
reservations).
85. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 16.5. Opponents of the WTO claim that
because developing countries have the same voting power as the United States and
control 83% of the vote in the WTO, the United States will consistently be outvoted
in WTO decisions. SAVE OUR SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 83. The United States Trade
Representative, however, emphasizes that voting would only take place as a "fall
back" procedure in the event no consensus is reached. USTR Letter, supra note 14,
addendum 1, at 2. Furthermore, the USTR asserts that the adoption of any amendments that are contrary to the United States' position would be tantamount to terminating trade relations between the United States and WTO members. Id. at 4. Therefore, the USTR indicates that because any severance of trade relations with the United States would create severe instability in world markets, forcing an unacceptable
WTO amendment on the United States is extremely unlikely. Id.
86. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 8.
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the most comprehensive GATT dispute resolution mechanism since
GATT's conceptionY The new dispute process inherited many of the

early GATT dispute mechanisms such as consultation,'

good offices,

conciliation and mediation.' Moreover, the Understanding incorporated
amendments to the panel procedure' and the appellate process."'
One of the Understanding's most important substantive changes to the
panel procedure is the adoption of panel reports.'- For the first time

since the creation of the panel process, a panel report can no longer be
blocked unilaterally." Once a panel report is adopted, the losing party
is obligated to implement the recommended changes within a reasonable
time or risk trade sanctions in the form of suspended concessions or

cross retaliation.' Thus, because of the serious trade consequences that
can result from the binding panel process, it will be one of the most
closely scrutinized provisions in the WTO. 6

Consequently, insuring impartial panel decisions will be a critical
issue. Understandably, a panelist's possible vested interest in a dispute is

an issue that must be addressed to ensure the fair adjudication of disputes.9 The Understanding, however, includes only limited conflict of

87. GA'F, supra note 2.

88. WTO, supra note 4, annex 11, art. 4.7. Parties to a dispute may first enter
into consultation proceedings under Article 4 of the Understanding. Id. If a dispute
cannot be settled by consultation within sixty days, the complaining party may request
a panel at that time or at any time, regardless of whether or not consultations have
been attempted. Id.
89. Id. annex II, art. 5. Good offices, conciliation and mediation proceedings may
be requested voluntarily, by any party to a dispute at any time. Id. annex 11.art. 5.3.
90. Id. annex II, arts. 6-16.
91. Id. annex II, arts. 17-21.
92. Id. annex II, art. 16.
93. Id. annex II, art. 16.4. A panel report may only blocked by a consensus. Id.
Furthermore, a panel report may be appealed, but the Appellate Report can also only
be blocked by consensus. Id. annex 11, art. 17.14.
94.

Id. annex II, arts. 21-22; see The GATT Lady Sings, supra note 81. at 595

(statement of John H. Jackson, law professor, University of Michigan) (reporting that
under the Constitution, the United States has the power to reject panel decisions in
extreme cases even though the rejection would be inconsistent with the United States'
obligations to the international community).
95. See The GATT Lady Sings, supra note 81, at 595 (statement of Duane L

Burnham, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. Abbott Laboratories) (recommending
that the WTO dispute settlement procedures be closely monitored once they take effect).
96. See infra notes 200-37 and accompanying text (recommending the strengthening of current WTO conflict of interest provisions).
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interest provisions that were imported from the Tokyo Round with little
modification.97
B.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROVISIONS AND WEAKNESSES

1. Citizenship Requirements
The most evident conflict of interest provision is Article 8.3 which
prevents citizens of one of the parties in a dispute from serving on the
panel.98 The Understanding also prohibits a government from instructing
or influencing panel members on issues related to a dispute." Realistically, shielding panel members from the economic and political influences of their governments may be impossible." Moreover, while the
current provisions may minimize the likelihood of nationalistic bias or a
government's influence on a panelist,' the WTO has not adequately
protected against conflicts of interest that are unrelated to a panel
member's national allegiance.
One of the reasons for this apparent omission may be that historically,
panel members were government officials. 2 Thus, preventing a gov-

97. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, arts. 8.3, 8.9; Tokyo Round Understanding, supra note 46, paras. 11, 14.
98. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 8.3. Members of customs unions and common markets are similarly ineligible to serve on a panel if their trading bloc is a
party to the dispute. Id. annex II, art. 8.3, n.6. Individuals from third parties with an
interest in a dispute are similarly ineligible. Id. annex II, art. 8.3. A third party member must voluntarily notify the DSB of any interest they may have in the dispute. Id.
annex II, art. 10.2. Furthermore, the Understanding requires that the interest is "substantial." Id. Attempting to identify the parties who have not voluntarily expressed
their interest and ascertaining whether that interest is "substantial" is a difficult and
complicated process. Plank, supra note 51, at 67. The Secretariat must analyze a third
party member's market structure and philosophies on trade as well as ascertaining
whether the party competes in the specific sector or industry involved in the dispute.
See id. at 67-68 (describing the "delicate" process of identifying third party members).
99. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 8.9.
100. See Jackson, supra note 66, at 42 (describing as inevitable the influence of
governments' economic trade policy and diplomatic relationships over their panel
members).
101. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, arts. 8.3, 8.9.
102. See Donald E. deKieffer, GATT Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in
International Trade Law, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 317, 323 (1980) (commenting
that the Secretariat's roster of panelists has historically been composed of Swiss and
Scandinavian civil servants); JACKSON, supra note 6, at 64 (discussing that the Tokyo
Round Understanding provided for the permissive use of non-governmental panel
members but preferred governmental individuals); Jackson, supra note 66, at 42 (stat-
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ernment from directing or influencing one of its officials is an understandable safeguard. The trend has been to increase the list of non-governmental individuals on the panel rosters."m

A non-governmental panel member will have the same Article 8.3
citizenship restrictions as a governmental panelist."' Governments are
thereby similarly prohibited from influencing or instructing a non-governmental panelist if the individual is a citizen."t The nature of trade
disputes,"° however, creates conflict of interest problems that are more
complex than the WTO's elementary citizenship safeguards"o can ef-

fectively prevent. Globalization and the proliferation of multinational
organizations create interests that span beyond an individual's citizenship.' A non-governmental panel member with no citizenship ties to

a party in a dispute could conceivably have an interest in the outcome
of the dispute. t Because a substantial number of non-governmental
trade experts are private sector attorneys affiliated with firms that represent various international industries,"' an attorney sitting on a panel is
ing that governmental officials were traditionally selected as panel members).
103. deKieffer, supra note 102, at 323: see Hudec. supra note 19. at 59-60 (predicting a need for outside experts for panel rosters instead of government officials).
Some GATT officials suggest the use of non-governmental experts as a primary
source for panel rosters. See Plank, supra note 51. at 70 (describing a proposal to
rely on more non-governmental experts in an attempt to "professionalize" the GATT
panel and lend credibility to a panel's neutrality). The new Understanding merely
provides that panels may be composed of qualified "governmental and/or non-governmental members." WTO, supra note 4, annex 11,art. 8.1. A panel can include, but is
not limited to, individuals who have been panelists or presented a case before a panel, senior trade policy officials from any WTO member state, representatives to the
WTO, GATT or any related committee regarding any GATT agreement. and trade
scholars. Id.
104. WTO, supra note 4. annex 11. art. 8.3. The prohibitions of article 8.3 apply
to all citizens of nations or customs unions that are involved in a dispute. Id.
105. Id.
106. See infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text (discussing the need for technical experts in antidumping and countervailing duty disputes).
107. WTO, supra note 4. annex II. arts. 8.3, 8.9.
108. See generally ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS. 110-18 (1991) (de-

scribing the new global "web" of international enterprises).
109. See infra notes 178-183 (discussing the two CAFTA panelists in the softwood
lumber case who were attorneys employed by firms repreenting Canadian lumber
interests).
110. See Christopher J. Murphy, Canada-U.S. Free Trade Resolution Dispute
Mechanism Panel Procedure: Will They Hold?, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. 585. 600 (1991)

(discussing the inevitable conflicts international trade attorneys will have with the subject matter of trade disputes).
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inevitably going to have a vested interest in the outcome of a dispute."
2. The Parties' Objection Rights
A key mechanism ensuring the composition of an impartial panel is a
party's right to object to panel nominees.'"2 When the Secretariat proposes a panelist, a party can only oppose the nomination for "compelling reasons.""' 3 While the text of the Understanding does not define
the compelling reasons requirement, past practice reveals the establishment of an accepted standard."' A party's belief that a panelist
may be biased has often constituted a compelling reason." 5 Parties
have rejected proposed panelists based merely upon the belief that the
individual would not vote in the party's favor."' Nonetheless, past
practice suggests that panel members relied on the safeguard provision
to influence panel composition more than to prevent individual conflicts
of interest."1 7 Furthermore, there is no guarantee that previous interpretations will define future standards." 8 If the parties thus continuously
object to nominations and are unable to agree on the panel composition,
the minimal conflict of interest safeguards contained in this provision
will become ineffective." 9
3. Role of the Director-General
If the parties do not agree on the panel composition within twenty
days, the Director-General becomes responsible for appointing a panel.' The Understanding mandates that the Director-General choose the
"most appropriate" panelists following consultations with the parties, the
chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), and the chairman of

I11. Id.
112. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art.
113. Id.
114. Plank, supra note 51, at 71.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 68
even though subsequent panels may view
fect").
119. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art.
120. Id.

8.6.

(stating that panel reports are not binding
the decisions as having a "persuasive ef8.7.
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the committee or council handling the dispute.'2 ' Regardless of whether
the Director-General appoints a panel based upon the required consultations, trade officials have suggested that the panel will be susceptible to
the Director-General's subjective influences.'2- Moreover, since the Understanding does not have an oversight mechanism to prevent the Direc-

tor-General from appointing a biased panel, consultations may have little
efficacy in preventing conflicts of interest. Once the panel composition
procedure defaults to the appointment stage, the parties are powerless to
reject panel nominees and must accept the Director-General's selections.' -

I.

THE UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS

The lack of more substantive conflict of interest provisions in the new
Understanding is surprising since one of the models for the WTO dispute settlement procedure, 4 the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement,"
provides relatively comprehensive conflict of interest
26
rules.
The verbatim adoption of the CAFTA provisions, however,

121. Id
122. See Cooper, supra note 14, at A12 (reporting that a Clinton Administration
official believed "[t]hings could get stacked" if the Director-General was solely responsible for the panel composition). The Clinton Administration official was concerned that placing the decision making power in the hands of the Director-General
could result in biased panel appointments. Telephone Interview with Helene Cooper.
Reporter, Wall Street Journal (Aug. 2, 1994).
123. See WVTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 8.7 (stating that the Chairman shall
inform members of panel appointments, but failing to provide for appeal of such
selections).
124. See Jeffrey J. Schott, U.S. Policies Toward the GATT Past. Present. Prospective, in GAIT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENr A TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR
A STRONGER REGIME 39 (Reinhard Rode ed.. 1990) (describing the use of the

CAFTA dispute settlement mechanism during the Uruguay Round negotiations as a
model for improving the GAIT dispute settlement procedure); URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 3, at 58 (discussing the input from the United States. Canada.
and Mexico in the Uruguay Round dispute settlement negotiations).
125. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1989. U.S.-Can., 27
I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter CAFTA].
126. Id. chs. 18, 19. Cf. E.C. Official Opposes U.S. Lawmakers' Proposal to Create U.S.-E.C. Dispute Panel, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 3, at 62, 63 (Jan. 18.
1994) (discussing the possibility of developing a dispute resolution procedure between
the European Community and the United States, similar to the one established in
Chapter 19 of CAFTA).
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would not necessarily remedy every WTO conflict of interest issue.
There are fundamental differences between the dynamics of dispute
resolution in bilateral and multilateral systems. One important difference
is that in bilateral arrangements like CAFTA, the pool of panelists is
invariably limited to the two party states.' 7 Furthermore, although the
CAFTA conflict of interest provisions are significantly stronger than
those 2in
the WTO, the CAFTA dispute procedure is not without
8
flaws.
1. Chapter 18 Conflict of Interest Rules
Chapter 18 of CAFTA establishes the primary panel procedure for
general disputes arising under the Agreement. 29 Much like the WTO,
the CAFTA procedure directs the parties to enter into consultations
followed by a panel procedure in the event that consultations fail. 3 '
While a Chapter 18 panel decision normally will not have the same
binding effect as panel decisions under the WTO, 3 the conflict of interest rules under Chapter 18 are similar to the WTO provisions.'32
Thus, Chapter 18 requires only that panelists not be affiliated with a
party or receive instructions from a party.'33

127. See Murphy, supra note 110, at 600 (explaining that the binational system of
CAFTA contributes to inevitable national interest conflicts when panelists are drawn
from the two countries involved in a dispute); see also infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (explaining the possible national interest bias of Canadian judges in
the softwood lumber case).
128. See generally Murphy, supra note 110, at 598-615 (describing the difficulties
experienced under the Chapter 19 provisions governing peremptory challenges, conflicts of interest, and extraordinary challenges).
129. See CAFTA, supra note 125, arts. 1804, 1807 (discussing consultations and
panel procedures respectively).
130. Id.
131. See id. art. 1807, para. 7 (allowing for contingency that panel report not be
published if commission so chooses). The intent of Chapter 18 is to allow the parties
to pursue the satisfactory settlement of disputes without resorting to retaliatory measures. Michael Krauss, The Record of the United States-Canada Binational Dispute
Resolution Panels, 6 N. Y. INT'L L. REv. 85 (1993).
132. Compare CAFTA, supra note 125, art. 1807, para. I (containing conflict of
interest rules for Chapter 18 panel procedures) with supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (discussing WTO conflict of interest provisions).
133. See CAFTA, supra note 125, art. 1807, para. 1 (stating that "panelists shall
be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability and sound judgment and,
where appropriate, have expertise in the particular matter under consideration").
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2. Chapter 19 Conflict of Interest Rules
a. Overview
Chapter 19 establishes substantially stronger conflict of interest rules
than those found in the WTO.' Furthermore, Chapter 19 is specifically designed for the settlement of anti-dumping and countervailing
duty disputes.'35 Thus, one reason why the conflict of interest provi-

sions under Chapter 19 are more rigorous than those in Chapter 18 is
because of the specific nature of the disputes."n Countervailing duty
and anti-dumping disputes 37 are more likely to involve private parties
and require trade specialists 3 ' than the types of trade disputes normal-

ly brought under Chapter 18.2"9 Therefore, the inevitable conflicts between private party interests and trade specialists warrant greater conflict

of interest measures. '4
134. Compare CAFTA, supra note 125, ch. 19 (containing conflict of interest rules
for binational dispute settlement procedures) with WTO. supra note 4, arts. 8.3, 8.9
(defining the conflict of interest guidelines for panelists).
135. CAFTA, supra note 125, ch. 19.
136. See Alan M. Rugman and Andrew Anderson, The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, Cases in the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement: An Economic Evaluation, 24 GEO. VASH. J. INT'L L. & Eco. 1, 15 (1990) (reporting that only three of
the eight Chapter 18 cases the Commission examined have resulted in the formation
of arbitration panels).
137. See generally ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE (John H. Jackson and Edwin
A. Vermulst eds., 1989) (comparing the antidumping laws of various nations): RICHARD DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER (1980) (providing a
detailed examination of anti-dumping history and practices): JACKsON. WVORLD TRADE,
supra note 19, at 217-69 (defining anti-dumping and countervailing duty rules and
policies).
138. Telephone Interview with GAIT Panel Member (name withheld upon request)
(July 26, 1994) (commenting that "technical" disputes such as those involving antidumping and countervailing duties are more likely to result in conflicts of interest
between the experts interpreting the disputes and the industries involved).
139. See CAFTA, supra note 125, art. 1801, para. I (stating that financial service,
countervailing duty, and anti-dumping disputes are not governed by Chapter 18). A
party's failure to eliminate contested tariffs is an example of a dispute that would fall
within the jurisdiction of Chapter 18. Id. ch. 4, art. 401. Chapter 18 would similarly
govern disputes concerning acceptable levels of contaminants in food. See id. ch. 8.
annex 708.1, sched. 12 (mandating rules governing the regulation of contaminants in
foods and beverages).
140. See Murphy, supra note 110, at 600-01 (discussing how private practitioners
selected for CAFTA panels are inherently prone to conflict of interest problems because of their relationship to private industry).
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CAFTA mandates that the majority of panel members must be lawyers. 4 ' Thus, with trade attorneys hearing disputes that may directly
affect a specific industry, the likelihood of conflicts of interest will increase.'4 2 Furthermore, similar to the WTO panel reports, Chapter 19
panel decisions are legally binding'43 unlike non-emergency action reports under Chapter 18.'" The likelihood of a conflict of interest between an attorney and an industry the attorney has represented, coupled
with the binding effect that a panel report can have on that industry,

strengthens the need for impartial panels.'45 Accordingly, the Chapter
19 rules governing conflicts of interest are designed to address these

concerns. 146
b. Preventative Measures

Annex 1901.2 of Chapter 19 provides that the five-member binational
panel will be composed of Canadian and United States trade experts
selected from a roster.'47 Similar to the WTO provisions and Chapter
18, a panel member may not be affiliated with a party or receive instructions from a party. 4' This is the only substantive similarity
be149
tween the conflict of interest rules of Chapter 19 and the WTO.
Annex 1901.2 of CAFTA allows a party to object to a panel member
nominee for any reason.' 0 Each party is allowed four peremptory challenges to the opposing party's nominees.'' Furthermore, if the parties

141. CAFrA, supra note 125, annex 1901.2, para. 2.
142. See Canada: Conflict of Interest Problems Hurting FTA Chapter 19 Dispute
Settlement, Lawyer Says, 8 INT'L TRADE RE'. (BNA) No. 22, at 813 (May 29, 1991)
(statement of Ivan Feltham, Professor of Business and Trade Law, The University of
Ottawa) (opining that conflict of interest issues are inevitable under the Chapter 19
practice of filling the majority of panel positions with international trade attorneys).
143. CAFTA, supra note 125, art. 1904, para. 9.
144. See supra note 131 (defining Chapter 11 emergency actions).
145. See Murphy supra note 110, at 600 (noting that regardless of the "objective
professionalism" required of panelists, trade attorneys will inevitably experience professional or personal conflicts of interest with the disputes they must adjudicate).
146. CAFTA, supra note 125, ch. 19.
147. Id. annex 1901.2, para. 1.
148. Id. Because CAFTA panels are binational, the citizenship safeguards present
in the WTO are unnecessary. See WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 8.3 (prohibiting
panelists who are citizens of a party in a dispute from sitting on the panel).
149. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (describing the conflict of
interest provisions in the WTO).
150. CAFTA, supra note 125, annex 1901.2, para. 2.
151. Id. annex 1901.2, para. 2; see supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text
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cannot agree on the composition of a panel, they choose panel members

by lot from each party's roster. 52 Therefore, unlike the WTO provisions, the possibility that a biased panel may be selected based on the
subjective discretion of a single official is unlikely.' 3
The conflict of interest safeguards in Chapter 19 also provide strict
measures to ensure that panel members adhere to an ethical code of
conduct.'" Panelists must sign disclosures' 5 listing business ties and
other personal and confidential information.'" If a panel member does

not sign a disclosure, the individual is disqualified from sitting on a
panel." Additionally, both parties are responsible for sanctions against
a panel member if the individual violates the disclosure orders.' 8

(discussing the "compelling reason" standard that a party must meet under the WVTO
before a panel member can be rejected).
152. CAFTA, supra note 125, annex 1901.2, paras. 24. Under Chapter 19, each
party must chose two panelists within 30 days. Id. annex 1901.2. para. 2. If after the
four allotted peremptory challenges the first four panelists have not been agreed upon,
the panelists are picked by lot. Id The fifth panelist must then be selected within the
next 25 days by the parties. Id. annex 1901.2, para. 3. If the parties cannot agree on
the fifth panelist, the four empaneled members select the fifth member. Id. If the four
panelists cannot agree, the fifth panelist is chosen by lot. Id.
153. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (describing how the VTO
Director-General is responsible for selecting panel members when the parties are unable to agree on the panel's composition).
154. CAFTA, supra note 125, annex 1901.2, para. 6.
155. See id. annex 1901.2, para. 7 (directing panelists from the United States to
sign protective orders for information and panelists from Canada to sign an undertaking for information).
156. 1d; see 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212 (1988) (codifying the procedural rules relating
to the investigation of information disclosed by panelists). Panelists will be required to
disclose, inter alia, existing or previous business, financial, social or personal relationships with the parties; direct or indirect personal or financial interest in the outcome
of the dispute; or any public advocacy of an issue related to the dispute. See Canada: Conflicts of Interest Rules for Members of F.TA. Panels Outlined in Crosbie
Letter, 6 IM'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 3, at 75, 76 (Jan. 18, 1989) [hereinafter
Crosbie Letter] (relaying the guidelines for prospective panelist disclosures exchanged
in a letter from John Crosbie, Canadian International Trade Minister. to Clayton
Yeutter, United States Trade Representative). Article 1910 of Chapter 19 directs the
United States and Canada to establish a code of conduct for committee members and
panelists through an exchange of letters. CAFTA, supra note 125. art. 1910.
157. CAFTA, supra note 125, annex 1901.2, para. 8.
158. Id. Annex 1901.2, paragraph 8 states that "[clach Party shall enforce such
sanctions with respect to any person within its jurisdiction" Id.
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c. Extraordinary Challenge
If a conflict of interest is suspected once the panel report has been
issued, Chapter 19 provides a safety valve that allows a party to challenge a decision. 59 Under the extraordinary challenge provision in Annex 1904.13, the challenging party must allege that a panel member was
biased or guilty of a "serious" conflict of interest."W The party must
also assert that the conflict or bias materially affected the outcome of
the decision and is a threat to the integrity of the panel procedure. 6 '
Unlike Chapter 19 panel disputes, which private appellants can bring,
only governments may invoke an extraordinary challenge.'62
Once a government asserts a claim, an Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) convenes to hear the allegations.' 63 An ECC is composed
of three former or active judges from the United States and Canada,
appointed from a roster of ten jurists."6 The ECC must establish
whether there is reason to bring the challenge under Annex 1904.1363
and then render a decision to vacate, remand, or affirm the original
panel decision."
Some commentators suggest that the extraordinary challenge provision
may be subject to abuse. 67 Others are concerned that industries will

159. Id. art. 1904, para. 13. The party must challenge the decision within a reasonable time after the panel has issued the report. Id.
160. Id. Article 1904, paragraph 13 states that a party may utilize the extraordinary challenge procedure if that party alleges that:
a) i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a serious
conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of conduct, ii) the
panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or iii) the panel
manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction set forth in this Article,
and b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affected
the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the binational review process,
Id.
161. Id.
162. See Krauss, supra note 131, at 89-90 (reporting how prior to CAFTA, parties
could file an appeal from decisions by the Court of International Trade).
163. CAFTA, supra note 125, annex 1904.13, para 1.
164. Id.
165. See supra note 160 (listing the issues a party must allege to file an extraordinary challenge under article 1904, paragraph 13).
166. CAFTA, supra note 125, annex 1904.13. Remanded cases are sent back to
the original panel for consideration in light of the committee's decision. Id.
167. Kristin Moody-O'Grady, Dispute Settlement Provisions in the NAFTA and the
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ignore panel decisions and use the extraordinary challenge procedure to
politicize the dispute process.' 6 Furthermore, although a code of conduct presumably guards against the likelihood of bias among ECC judges, Canadian judges have not voted in favor of United States interests."6
Nonetheless, the extraordinary challenge provides CAFTA parties with
a valuable safety valve that enables them to challenge conflicts of interest and other panel misconduct.7' Furthermore, a panel decision under
CAFTA can be challenged based upon the actions of the panel member,

unlike a WTO panel report appeal that must relate to the relevant law
concerning the dispute or the legal interpretation of the panel's decision.' While the Chapter 19 conflict of interest rules seem to efficiently ensure the composition of impartial panels, a recent dispute"-

illustrates that Chapter 19 is not flawless.
B. CHAPTER 19 PROVISIONS IN PRACTICE:
THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER DISPUTE

1. Background

The United States and Canada have been embroiled in an ongoing
CAFTA: Progress or Protectionism?, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AI:. 121. 130 (1994).
168. See id. (citing Dispute Resolution Procedures for U.S.-Canada F.T.A. Run

Into Trouble,

GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS,

Apr. 9. 1991).

169. See Charles Abbott, U.S., Rebuffed, Will Refund Some Canada Lumber Duties,
REuTER EUR. Bus. REP., Aug. 3. 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
REUTER File (statement of Malcom Wilkey, United States judge on the softwood
lumber ECC) (asserting that of the six votes on the three Extraordinary Challenge
Committees, Canadian committee members have cast all of their votes against the
United States Commerce Department's position).
170. See Moody-O'Grady, supra note 167, at 130 (opining that the ECC, acting as
a bilateral judiciary panel, ensures the continued progression of the CAFTA dispute
settlement process).
171. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 17.6.
172. United States Trade Representative v. Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01USA. 1994
WL 405928 (U.S. Can. F.T.A. Binat'l Trade Panel Aug. 3, 1994)
173. See Murphy, supra note 110, at 601 (arguing that the CAFTA panel process
can be cumbersome). In one case a panel procedure was completely suspended when
an attorney recused himself from a countervailing duty dispute because of conflict of
interest problems. Id. at 600. Furthermore, because a panelist is prohibited from representing the parties for one year following the proceeding, panel members are sometimes reluctant to serve. See Hurting FTA. supra note 142, at 814 (stating that attorneys are intimidated by the Chapter 19 one year restriction against representation of
an involved party).
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dispute regarding alleged subsidies of the Canadian softwood lumber
industry.'
The United States asserts that softwood lumber imported
from Canada materially injures the American lumber industry. 7 ' On
December 17, 1993, a binational panel remanded a softwood lumber

countervailing duty case, holding that the evidence available was not
sufficient to support the United States Commerce Department's allegations of Canadian subsidies.' 76 Following the decision, an attorney
from a United States lumber industry trade association searched the
public records of two Canadian panelists.'77
The panelists were Canadian trade attorneys employed by firms representing Canadian lumber companies.'
The attorneys failed to report
complete information on the required disclosure statements.'79 The
United States filed an extraordinary challenge, 8 ' alleging that the panelists had conflicts of interest'"' based on their firms' ties to the Cana-

174. See generally United States Trade Representative v. Canada, supra note 172
(detailing a concise account of the facts and issues surrounding the softwood lumber
dispute).
175. See Countervailing Duties: Panel Orders ITC to Reconsider Earlier Softvood
Lumber Ruling, I1 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1110 (July 13, 1994) (discussing the three earlier softwood lumber rulings of the International Trade Commission).
176. See Countervailing Duties: United States Challenges Softwood Lumber Panel
Decision, I1 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 586 (April 13, 1994) [hereinafter
U.S. Challenges Decision] (stating that the three Canadian members on the panel
voted to remand while the two U.S. panelists voted to uphold the determination of
the United States Department of Commerce).
177. Greg Rushford, Lawyers' Ties Spur Bias Claim, LEGAL TIMES, June 20, 1994,
at 5. John Ragosta, the attorney responsible for the public record search of the two
Chapter 19 panelists, represents the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.; see supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text (explaining that signed
disclosure statements must be filed with the Secretariat before an individual can sit on
a CAFTA panel).
180. U.S. Challenges Decision, supra note 176, at 586. The United States filed the
extraordinary challenge on April 6, 1994. Id.
181. Id. Trade officials stated that the challenge was necessary to ensure complete
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the panel procedure. Countervailing
Duties: U.S. Plans Conflict of Interest Challenge in Canadian Lumber Dispute, 11
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 9, at 350 (March 2, 1994) (statement of Ira S.
Shapiro, General Counsel for the United States Trade Representative). Lumber industry
representatives assert that in order to maintain a bias free system, Congress should
review what the industry perceives as serious procedural problems in Chapter 19 binational panels. Id. (statement of John A. Ragosta, attorney, U.S. Coalition for Fair
Lumber Imports). John A. Ragosta was responsible for the initial complaint to the
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dian lumber industry.2 - The ECC, composed of two Canadian judges
and one American judge, handed down a decision in four months."
The ECC dismissed the request for an extraordinary challenge on the
grounds that the United States had failed to meet the necessary standard."8 The vote was two to one, with the two Canadian judges voting
to reject the United States claim." In dissent, the United States judge
asserted that the committee had made errors in its decision" and that
the two attorneys had materially breached the Chapter 19 Code of Conduct by failing to fully disclose certain professional ties."g

United States and Canada regarding his discovery of information that had not been
disclosed by the two panelists. Rushford, supra note 177, at 5.
182. Rushford, supra note 177, at 5. One of the panelists, Richard Dearden, had
disclosed his firm's ties to some specific Canadian lumber companies, an American
carpenter's labor union and the Canadian Government. Id. He did not disclose that his
firm also represented the United States Trade Representative, the Commerce Department and other Canadian lumber companies. Id. The other panelist. Lawson Hunter,
had disclosed that his firm represented three Canadian lumber companies. Id. He did
not report in his disclosure statement that a firm he joined in 1993 lobbied Canadian
lumber firms or that he had represented the Canadian Transport Department. Id. But
see Canada: Comment - Get Agreement On Subsidies Code. FIN. PosT, Aug. 4, 1994
at 8 [hereinafter Agreement On Subsidies Code] (reporting that among the conflicts
listed, one complaint involved work done over 30 years ago by a deceased attorney
for one of the firms and a second incident cited work that was performed by an
attorney while he was a student at another firm).
183. United States Trade Representative v. Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01USA, 1994
WL 405928 (U.S. Can. F.T.A. Binat'l Trade Panel Aug. 3, 1994).
184. Id. Canadian committee member, Justice Gordon Hart stated that "[i]n this
case it is my view that there was no intentional refusal to reveal any matter that
would justify the opposite party in removing either panelist and the request by the
U.S. government for an extraordinary challenge should be rejected." Id.
185. Abbott, supra note 169. One Canadian judge stated that he was concerned
that the lopsided vote would be interpreted as the result of national bias. Id.
186. See Agreement on Subsidies Code, supra note 182. at 8 (noting that Malcom
Wilkey, the dissenting United States ECC judge, stated that the decision was "aberrant"); Countervailing Duties: Canada Prevails in Sofnmood Lumber E.rtraordinary
Challenge Ruling, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 32 (Aug. 10, 1994). available in
WESTLAW, BNA-ITR database (statement of Judge Malcom Wilkey) (asserting that
the ECC "Binational Panel Majority opinion may violate more principles of appellate
review of agency action than any opinion by a reviewing body that (Judge Wilkey]
ever read").
187. United States Trade Representative v. Canada, 1994 WL 405928 (Wilkey. J..
dissenting). Judge Wilkey stated that "to tolerate such a failure to disclose would
constitute the most obvious and dangerous threat to the integrity of the Binational
Panel review process, because the selection of these members rests entirely on the
voluntary, complete and continuing disclosure of any possible affiliations casting
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A number of groups affected by the outcome of the dispute were
dissatisfied with the decision.'88 United States lumber industry trade
associations claim that American industries will not be able to rely on
the process.' 89 Legislators asserted that the holding raised serious concerns about the CAFTA dispute resolution process."g Canadian industry officials are pleased with the decision, but expressed concern over
the expense and length of time involved in the procedure.' Moreover,
Canadian government officials suggest that an improved method of settlement procedures for countervailing duty and anti-dumping disputes
will be necessary to ensure an integrated market between the United
States and Canada.' The most measurable consequence of the decision, however, is the resulting $578 million in duties the United States
must return to the Canadian lumber industry. 93

doubts on the members' impartiality." Id.
188. Canada-U.S. Lumber Dispute Ends in Canadian Victory: Final Challenge Upholds Earlier Finding of No Subsidy, PR NEWSwtRE, Aug. 3, 1994, available in
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS database [hereinafter Canadian Victory] (statement of Tom
Buell, Chairman, Canadian Forest Industries Council); Agreement on Subsidies Code,
supra note 182, at 8 (statement of Harold Maxwell, Chairman, U.S. Coalition for Fair
Lumber Imports).
189. Agreement on Subsidies Code, supra note 182, at 8 (statement of Harold
Maxwell, Chairman, U.S. Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports); see also Abbott, supra
note 169 (reporting that while no United States trade officials had publicly commented on the ECC ruling, one official had "privately expressed disappointment").
190. Countervailing Duties: Lawmakers Blast Canada Lumber Ruling, Urge Solution to Flaws in Panel System, I1 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 34 (Aug. 24, 1994)
available in WESTLAW, BNA-ITR database (statements of Sen. John Breux and Sen.
J. Bennett Johnson). Senator Jesse A. Helms stated that if the ECC ruling is indicative of the decisions that will be handed down by international dispute resolution
panels, "then Congress must assume that the dispute settlement system in the World
Trade Organization will even further impair the sovereign right of the U.S. to interpret its own laws." Id.
191. Canadian Victory, supra note 188 (statement of Tom Buell, Chairman. Canadian Forest Industries Council).
192. Agreement on Subsidies Code, supra note 182, at 8 (statement of Roy
MacLaren, Canadian Trade Minister).
193. Abbott, supra note 169. The United States Department of Commerce had
imposed a 6.51% duty on all Canadian softwood lumber exported to the United
States. Id. Canadian officials expect a refund of approximately $578 million in duties
owed to Canadian lumber firms. Id.; see Canada Hails U.S.-Canada Lumber Panel
Decision, REUTER NEwsWIRE, Aug. 3, 1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS database (statement of Roy MacLaren, Canadian Trade Minister) (asserting his expectations that the United States promptly implement the decision of the ECC to ensure
that Canadian industries receive the C$800 million, plus interest, that was collected by
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2. Implications of the Case
While the Chapter 19 panel procedure may not be flawless, the softwood lumber case illustrates CAFTA's relatively effective conflict of
interest provisions. Simultaneously, the decision reflects the practical
impossibility of assuring complete neutrality in dispute resolution panels."9 Even if the softwood lumber ruling and the lopsided voting history of the ECC are the result of bias, guarding against the influence of
national interests in a binational system may be impossible.'
Nonetheless, the economic repercussions of the decision reflect the necessity of safeguarding against conflicts of interest in a binding panel
process.' 9'
Rules that require full disclosure by panelists and allow parties to
challenge alleged panel bias are considerably stronger than the provision
available under the WTO. 19 That is not to say that Chapter 19 is the
ultimate paradigm for the strengthening of the WTO provisions."
Nevertheless, conflict of interest guidelines modeled after Chapter 19,
tailored to the requirements of a multinational organ and modified to
remedy the flaws, may provide the best means of decreasing the likelihood of biased panels tainting the equitable adjudication of intemational trade disputes.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PANEL COMPOSITION
1. Increase Panel Size
One of the simplest ways to decrease the likelihood that a conflict of

the United States government).
194. See Plank, supra note 51, at 70 (stating that "there is probably no such thing
as a bona fide neutral unless the individual in question has never heard about the
GATT or is comatose").

195. See id. (describing the practical impossibility of preventing national interest
influences on panelists).
196. See Abbott, supra note 169 (calculating that the United States must refund
approximately $578 million in duties to Canadian lumber firms as a result of a 6.51%
duty imposed on all Canadian softwood lumber exports).
197. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (explaining the WTO conflict
of interest provisions).
198. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text (discussing some of the criticisms of the Chapter 19 panel procedure).
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interest will affect the outcome of a dispute is to increase the size of
the panel. Unlike a Chapter 19 panel, a WTO panel is composed of
three panelists, unless the parties agree to five.' The dynamics of
group decision-making suggest that five-member panels may decrease
the likelihood that a conflict of interest would influence a panel's decision. 2" Additionally, five diverse individuals would arguably bring a
different dynamic to the deliberation process through a broader range of
experiences."' Weaknesses inherent in larger panels, such as lengthier
deliberations and additional strains on panel rosters, 2° can be remedied. The inclusion of more non-governmental panel members could
increase the availability of qualified members and minimize the depletion of panel rosters." 3 Additionally, the parties' rigid adherence to

199. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 8.5.
200. See Tatsuya Kameda, Procedural Influence in Small Group Decision Making:
Deliberation Style and Assigned Decision Rules, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL.
245, 250 (1991) (asserting that when a decision task is based upon a dichotomous
option of finding for or against one party, a minority position will not have a substantial basis of defense against the majority consensus); Walter C. Swap, Destructive
Effects on Groups of Individuals, in GROUP DECISION MAKING 69, 81 (Walter C.
Swap & Assoc. eds., 1984) (reporting that the majority of decision-making studies
reveal that increasing the size of a group results in more conformity among the members); Hugo Bedau, Ethical Aspects of Group Decision Making in GROUP DECISION
MAKING 115, 125 (Walter C. Swap & Assoc. eds., 1984) (discussing the dynamics of
ethical reasoning in groups where conflicts of interest may be involved); see also
William H. Smoke and Robert B. Zajonc, On the Reliability of Group Judgments and
Decisions in MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN SMALL GROUP PROCESSES 322, 323 (Joan
H. Criswell et al. eds., 1962) (finding that in five member group experiments, there is
an increased probability that the group will arrive at a quorum).
201. See Plank, supra note 51, at 66 (stating that parties in GATT disputes have
requested five member panels to ensure a broader spectrum of ideas on the issues
before the panel); Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels
as the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. 707, 714 (1993) (opining that CAFTA experiences have revealed a different dynamic created by five member panels).
202. See Moyer, supra note 201, at 714 (noting that CAFTA panels will often
deliberate for several hours without breaks); see also Plank, supra note 51, at 66
(stating how the three panel procedure under earlier GATT provisions had developed
as the rule because of the lack of panelists available during multiple panel disputes).
203. See WTO, supra note 4, annex 11, art. 8.4 (providing that the Secretariat is
responsible for maintaining the original and supplemental GATr rosters and that
members can update the roster lists periodically). The roster of panelists maintained
by the Secretariat must be supplemented more frequently than is currently requested
by the Understanding. See id. annex II (stating that the Contracting Parties "may
periodically suggest names of governmental and non-governmental individuals") (em-
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deliberation timetables should decrease the likelihood of delays.'
2. Allow Peremptory Challenges
The current "compelling reason" standard that a party must satisfy to
reject a panel nominee is uncertain.' While the standard has been a
relatively simple threshold to satisfy, there are no guidelines to ensure
the adherence to past practices.' Furthermore, under the current system, assessing whether a party has a compelling reason is a subjective
determination left to the Secretariat. 7 Therefore, invoking the Chapter
19 model of peremptory challenges would eliminate subjectivity from
the process." 8
phasis added). The Contracting Parties should be required to submit updated panel
member recommendations to the standing roster as often as the DSB deems necessary,
depending on the number of disputes filed with the DSB, to ensure an adequate list
of experts. See id annex II, art. 2.2 (directing the DSB to meet "as often as necessary to carry out its functions within the time frames provided in this Understanding"). Therefore, a sufficient pool of experts will ensure that the panelists that are
disqualified due to conflicts of interest, peremptory challenges or citizenship ineligibility will not deplete the available pool of panel members. Cf Murphy, supra note 110,
at 600 (explaining how CAFTA panel delays are infrequent even though panel rosters
are insufficient).
204. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text (describing the increasing
number of non-governmental panel members on GATT rosters). Chapter 19 panels
have generally met CAFTA timetables. Moyer, supra note 201, at 717. These timetables have been adhered to even
though the pool of available experts has been insufficient. Murphy, supra note 110, at
600. Therefore, preventing a drawn out panel composition procedure under the WTO
will depend to a large extent on the parties' adherence to WTO timetables. See
Plank, supra note 51, at 95 (asserting that timely cooperation with the GAT panel
procedure is the responsibility of the parties). Since the WTO time limits are relatively rigid, there is little room for intentional delays by the parties. See id. at 94 (revealing that Rosine Plank was unaware of any intentional panel delays during her
term as a GAIT official).
205. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text (explaining the procedure for
objecting to panel nominees).
206. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (asserting that in past practice, in order to meet the "compelling interest" standard, a party's mere assertion that
they believed a panel nominee would be biased was often sufficient for an objection).
207. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 8.6.
208. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (describing the Chapter 19
peremptory challenge procedure). If the current standard becomes more rigid or fluctuated, the peremptory challenge rule would guarantee a party the right to object outright to a panel member nomination. See CAFTA. supra note 125. ch. 19, annex
1901.2, par. 2 (stating that the parties have the right to four confidential peremptory
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Draw Panelists by Lot

If the parties cannot agree on the composition of a panel, panelists
should be selected by lot" rather than under a subjective standard
based on who the Director-General "considers most appropriate." '
The Understanding mandates that panel prospects be listed on the rosters
by experience in their respective sectors.2" ' Therefore, a simple system
of grouping panel members by subject matter could generate a list of
qualified individuals for each specific dispute. Provided that the number
of panelists on the WTO roster is continually supplemented, no additional burden should be placed on the available pool of eligible individuals.2" 2
B.

ETHICAL GUIDELINES

1. Institute a Code of Conduct
Unlike CAFTA, the WTO does not have a code of conduct for panelists or Appellate Body members.2" 3 While panelists are not necessarily

challenges). Critics of the Chapter 19 peremptory challenge rule argue that lengthy
delays make the procedure cumbersome. Murphy, supra note 110, at 601. Trade experts suggest that the rules governing arbitration in the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) would provide effective guidelines for limiting peremptory challenge timetables. Note, Summary of Proceedings of the Seminar on
Dispute Resolution Under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 26 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 153, 178 (1989) (comment by Stewart Baker, trade attorney, Steptoe &
Johnson, Washington, D.C.). Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules directs a
party to file a peremptory challenge within fifteen days of receiving the information
that has prompted the challenge. The Arbitration Rules of the United States Commission for International Trade Law, U.N. CITRL, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, art. 11,
para. I, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976). Regardless of whether the WTO follows the
UNCITRAL rules, limiting the time allotted for a party to make peremptory challenges could easily correspond with the time allowed to voice objections to nominees
under the current provision. See WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 8.7 (stating that
the parties have twenty days from the time of the establishment of a panel to agree
on the panel composition).
209. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (explaining the Chapter 19 process of selecting panelists by lot).
210. WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 8.7.
211. Id. annex II, art. 8.4.
212. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (recommending continuous supplementation of panel rosters).
213. See WTO, supra note 4, annex II, arts. 8.1, 8.2 (stating that panel members
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judges, they act in a judicial capacity when rendering panel deci-

sions.2 "4 Thus, judicial codes of conduct derived from various countries
could provide suitable models. 2 s A majority of international judicial
codes provide guidelines regulating the ethical behavior of judges." 6
The United States judicial codes2 t 7similarly include rules governing financial, personal and business ties.

should be well qualified and chosen in accordance with the policy considerations of
ensuring independence, diversity and experience).
214. See Moyer, supra note 201, at 713 (stating that dispute settlement panels
under Chapter 19 of NAFTA "stand in the shoes" of the courts). But see David A.
Wirth, The Role of Science in the Unguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 2, on file with The American
University Journal of hiternational Law and Policy) (referring to the dispute settle-

ment process in regional and multilateral trade agreements as "quasi-adjudicatory").
215. See Library of Congress, Judicial Tenure: The Removal and Discipline of
Judges in Selected Countries, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 1459 (1993) (hereinafter Judicial Tenure] (list-

ing judicial ethical standards and discipline procedures in 26 countries and five international judicial bodies).
216. See id. at 1476-77 (reporting that in Argentina, activities considered incompatible with judicial status include, inter alia, political activity, commercial activity.
and acting as an attorney); id. at 1497 (stating that judges in Brazil are prohibited
from engaging in commercial activities or from being involved in a commercial corporation); id.at 1550-51 (explaining that Greece's Supreme Disciplinary Council will
sanction a judge for "exploiting judicial status for personal gain" or for acting "improper").
Alternatively, drafting a code of conduct patterned after international arbitration
provisions would similarly provide an effective ethical code for the WTO. INTEtNATIONAL BAR ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
Canon l-D (1987) [hereinafter IBA CODE OF ETHIcS]. Canon l-D of the IBA Rules

of Ethics states that following appointment, an arbitrator should:
avoid entering into any financial, business, professional, family or social relationship, or acquiring any financial or personal interest, which is likely to affect
impartiality or which might reasonably create the appearance of partiality or bias. For a reasonable period of time after the decision of a case. persons who
have served as arbitrators should avoid entering into any such relationship, or
acquiring any such interest, in circumstances which might reasonably create the
appearance that they had been influenced in the arbitration ....
la.; see also International Chamber of Commerce: New Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration, Jan. 1, 1988, art. 1,para. 7, 28 I.L.M. 231, 237 (hereinafter ICC Rules
of Arbitration] (requiring that an arbitrator disclose information that may result in a
conflict of interest).
217.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLI-

CIES AND PROCEDURES, CODES OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES AND JUDICIAL EsiPI.oYiES.

1-9 to 1-12 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.

JUDICIAL CODES). Canon 3C(I) of the Code of
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2. Require Disclosure Statements and Recusal
As illustrated by the softwood lumber case, the use of non-governmental trade experts as panel members will inevitably result in conflicts
of interest." 8 Thus, in addition to a code of conduct, panel members
should be required to sign and continuously supplement disclosure statements similar to those required under Chapter 19, providing the DSB
with confidential financial, personal, and business information.219 A
panel member's disclosure statement would presumably reveal possible
conflicts of interest. 220 Similar to the Chapter 19 provisions, the documents could be filed confidentially with the Secretariat and an investigating authority, such as the Appellate Body,2"' that would be responConduct states:
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; ...
(c) the judge knows that, individually or as a fiduciary, the judge . . . has a
financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding ....
Id. at 1-10. A financial interest is defined as "ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other active participant in
the affairs of a party ....... Id. at I-I1.
218. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood that
private sector attorneys affiliated with various industries and acting as panelists will
have conflicts of interest with the subject matter of disputes).
219. See CAFTA, supra note 125, annex 1901.2, para. 7 (outlining the signed
statements required by CAFTA panel members). A number of international arbitration
rules similarly request that arbitrators submit written disclosures. See, e.g., ICC Rules
of Arbitration, supra note 216, art. 1, para. 7 (stating that an arbitrator must submit a
written disclosure listing "facts or circumstances which might be of such a nature as
to call into question the arbitrator's independence in the eyes of the parties"); AMERICAN ARE. ASS'WN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 7 (1991) (requiring that a
prospective arbitrator disclose any circumstances that may create doubts as to the
arbitrator's independence or neutrality).
220. See Crosbie Letter, supra note 156, at 76 (noting the information required
under the Chapter 19 disclosure statements). Conflict of interest disclosure requirements would also apply to third party members and would therefore alleviate some of
the current problems of ascertaining whether a party had a substantial interest in the
dispute. See supra note 98 (discussing third party members).
221. See WTO, supra note 4, annex II, art. 17 (listing the rules governing the
Standing Appellate Body). The WTO Appellate Body is composed of seven members,
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sible for investigating conflicts of interest.'

Additionally, unlike Chapter 19, WTO panel members with conflicts
of interest should be required to recuse themselves from the dispute tm

The disqualification rules in the United States judicial codes of conduct 4 or in international judicial codes would
recusal models. "'

provide effective

C. EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE
1. Allow Extraordinary Challenges

In instances where the recommended conflict of interest safeguards
have not adequately guaranteed the composition of an impartial panel,
the parties must have a safety valve to challenge the panel's decision.' The extraordinary challenge mechanism in CAFTA is an effective guideline. ' 7 The WTO appellate procedure, which allows panel
appeals based only on questions of law,m should be amended to permit challenges for alleged panel member bias, violations of the code of
conduct, serious conflicts of interest and gross misconduct. 'm Further-

more, requiring a challenging party to assert that a panelist's actions

appointed by the DSB, serving terms of two to four years. Id. arts. 17.1. 17.2.
222. See 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212, supra note 156. at 53,218 (describing the procedure
for filing Chapter 19 disclosure statements with the Secretariat and the investigating
authority).
223. See Crosbie Letter, supra note 156. at 76 (reporting that under Chapter 19.
panel members with conflicts of interest are not required to recuse themselves and
can still serve on a panel once a conflict has been disclosed).
224. See U.S. JUDICIAL CODES, supra note 217, §§ 3.1-3.6 (mandating a judge's
recusal and disqualification based upon, inter alia, financial interests, family relationships, relationships to law firms, government interests, and other personal and business
relationships).
225.

See generally Judicial Tenure, supra note 215 (listing disqualification proce-

dures for judges in various countries and international organizations). Disqualification
provisions in international arbitration rules provide additional guidelines for a WVTO
recusal requirement. See IBA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 216, Canon 1I-E (defining
rules of withdrawal for an arbitrator alleged to be biased or partial).
226. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text (explaining the extraordinary
challenge procedures under Chapter 19 of CAFTA).
227. See CAFTA, supra note 125, annex 1904.13 (outlining the extraordinary challenge procedure).
228. See WTO, supra note 4, annex 11, art. 17.6 (limiting panel report appeals to
issues of law and the legal interpretations of the panel members).
229. See CAFrA, supra note 125, art. 1904. para. 13 (listing the allegations a
party may assert under the extraordinary challenge procedure).
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materially affected the panel decision and jeopardized the integrity of
the process23 would establish a rigorous standard that should guard
against the proliferation of frivolous challenges."3
2. Provide Appellate Review
Following the assertion of a challenge, the WTO Appellate Body
should be responsible for reviewing the allegations." 2 Because the Appellate Body is a multinational panel, the possibility of national influences affecting the outcome of the review would be minimized.233 Under the WTO, three international legal experts unaffiliated with any
government or other organizational interest would hear challenges of
panelist impropriety. 4 Furthermore, an appellate member would be
unable to preside over any challenge in which that member had a conflict of interest.3 5 Therefore, an extraordinary challenge review by the
Appellate Body would not be susceptible to the type of bias that may
have affected the softwood lumber ECC.236
CONCLUSION
The WTO represents a promising step toward the realization of the
international trade body originally envisioned by the GATT Contracting
Parties. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes embodies many of the customs and organizational
practices developed in the past forty-five years. The history of the panel
procedure illustrates this growth. From the DISC case wrought with

230. See id. art. 1904, para. 13(b) (stating that a party filing an extraordinary
challenge must assert that conflict of interest, bias, or gross misconduct of a panel
member has "materially affected" the decision and "threatens the integrity" of the
panel process).
231. See Murphy, supra note 110, at 596 (asserting that since the extraordinary
challenge was intended to be invoked only in rare circumstances, the challenging
party must therefore meet a rigid standard).
232. See generally WTO, supra note 4, annex 11, arts. 17-20 (defining the rules
governing the WTO appellate review).
233. See supra notes 185-86 (discussing the possibility of bias on the softwood
lumber ECC).
234: WTO, supra note 4, annex II, arts. 8.9, 17.3.
235. Id. annex II, art. 17.3. Appellate Body members "shall be unaffiliated with
any government" and "shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that
would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest." Id.
236. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (describing the possible national interest bias of the two Canadian judges on the softwood lumber ECC).
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delays and vague panel reports, to the legally binding panel procedure
of the WTO, GATT has developed a generally effective dispute resolution procedure. Nonetheless, the conflict of interest provisions in the
Understanding remain inadequately equipped to deal with the realities of
increasing globalization and the rapid expansion of trade.
As international trade issues become more complex, the need for
qualified experts to referee disputes increases. Invariably, those who are
the most qualified are also the most familiar with the subject matter,
thereby increasing the likelihood of a conflict of interest. This comment
proposes that the WTO adopt rigorous conflict of interest provisions
modeled after the rules in CAFTA Chapter 19.
. Establishing a code of ethics and requiring signed disclosures may
reveal possible conflicts prior to panel deliberations. Increasing panel
size and allowing peremptory challenges can minimize the effect that a
conflict of interest may have on the outcome of a dispute. Finally,
adopting a procedure that allows appellate review of alleged panel bias
provides a necessary safety valve which enables parties to challenge
decisions adversely affected by panelist impropriety.
Incorporating these recommendations into the legally binding dispute
settlement procedure of the WTO may promote the successful adjudication of disputes by minimizing the possibility of biased panel decisions.
Although ensuring the absolute impartiality of panels may be a practical
impossibility, failing to protect against the likelihood of conflicts of
interest may harm the international trading community and jeopardize
the integrity of the WTO.

